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 Land rental markets in the process of rural structural transformation:  
Productivity and equity impacts in China 
 
Abstract: While the importance of land rental for overall economic development has long been recognized in theory, 
empirical evidence on the productivity and equity impact of such markets and the extent to which they realize their 
potential has been scant. Representative data from China’s nine most important agricultural provinces illustrate the 
impact of rental markets on households’ economic strategies, their welfare, and productivity of land use at the plot 
level. While there are positive impacts in each of these dimensions, transaction costs constrain participation by many 
producers, thus preventing rental markets from attaining their full potential. Factors that increase transaction costs are 
identified, together with a rough estimate of the productivity- and equity- impact of removing them.  
 
1. Introduction 
In settings where, historically, land and power were distributed in a very unequal fashion, a key role 
of land rental markets has been to transfer land from large owners to landless workers or small 
landowners to achieve an outcome more efficient than cultivation based on wage labor. With 
traditional labor-intensive technology, high levels of risk, and lack of alternative opportunities, the 
scope for potential renters to bargain was limited especially if population growth led to a decrease in 
the amount of land available. As the main function of markets was to equalize endowment ratios, land 
market activity remained low in environments where land was distributed a more equitably.  
With widespread availability of off-farm employment opportunities, economic growth that provides a 
basis for large-scale transfer of labor out of the agricultural sector, and increased importance of new 
technology and links to supply chains, the importance of rural factor markets, including those for land 
rental, has increased significantly. In such an environment, mechanisms to allow flexible and low-cost 
transfer of land to their most productive use will generate opportunities of relevance to the broader 
transformation of the rural economy and provide a basis for rural welfare to increase over time.  
The potential of land rental to contribute to the transformation of rural economies and its advantages 
compared to transactions in other factor markets, are well recognized (de Janvry et al. 2001). For 
example, and rental can enhance productivity and equity and contribute to structural change by 
allowing less skilled or old producers to participate in the non-farm economy while still deriving 
benefits from their land  Compared to other options to transfer land, e.g. via sales markets, the fact 
that rental requires only limited capital outlay and offers ways to overcome market imperfections in 
labor or credit markets through choice of contractual forms (Otsuka and Hayami 1988) leads to much 
lower transaction costs and thus greater flexibility. At the same time, it is often not clear to what 
extent rental markets live up or fall short of their potential, what policy actions might be required to 
allow better realization of existing opportunities, and what the magnitude of associated productivity- 
and welfare-gains might be.  
In this paper, we use the case of land rental in China to addresses is issue at a conceptual and an 
empirical level. The conceptual basis for doing so is a model with producers who have idiosyncratic 
levels of agricultural ability, an exogenous non-agricultural wage rate, and transaction costs in the land market. This allows us to make predictions on the impact of changed availability of non-
agricultural employment opportunities and the level of transaction costs on land markets, occupational 
choice, agricultural productivity, and the distribution of income. Following the literature on market 
participation, we use a switching regression of land rental participation to assess factors that increase 
the cost of participation and thus may reduce the extent of land rental activity and associated benefits. 
Combining standard household survey information with evidence on the other party involved in land 
market transactions and productivity of plots before and after having been transferred in the market 
allows us to make inferences on the benefits from land rental in terms of diversification of income 
sources, household welfare, and agricultural productivity. Doing so leads to some interesting findings.  
First, the impact of land rental on productive efficiency is surprisingly large, with an estimated 
increase in net revenues by almost 60% even once overall productivity increases are netted out. About 
one third of these gains accrue to landlords in the form of rental payments while two thirds are 
received by tenants. Second, in addition to facilitating a significant improvement in tenants’ welfare, 
the fact that tenants normally come from the lower parts of the asset distribution implies that these 
gains help improve the distribution of income. In our setting, land rental provides a key avenue for the 
rural population to take on non-agricultural jobs, in most cases via migration. To illustrate the 
significance of this phenomenon note that, of the landlords in our sample, 57% relied on agriculture as 
their main source of income before renting out their land but only 17% did so thereafter. In fact, 
income gains for those renting out are estimated to be even larger than the gains accruing to tenants. 
Finally, despite the economic benefits from engaging in land rental, local regulations and limited 
tenure security increase the associated transaction cost, thus constraining participation by some 
households and the associated welfare gains. Respondents’ subjective perceptions and the fact that -
despite the significant productivity losses entailed in such a priori limitation of the set of possible 
transaction partners- a large part of them transact exclusively with relatives support this notion.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two provides background on land relations and land rental 
markets in China, derives predictions from a household model of rental participation and discusses the 
empirical strategy. Section three discusses data sources and sampling and provides basic descriptive 
statistics from our data. Section four contains detailed evidence on equity- and productivity-impacts 
of land rental and results from econometric estimation. Section five concludes by drawing out policy 
implications for China and other countries.  
2. Evolution of land tenure in China and conceptual framework  
By tracing the evolution of land tenure and land market activity in this country, we highlight the 
continuing rapid pace of structural change in China and the steps taken to gradually improve land 
tenure security so as to improve the potential for decentralized land transfers. We use these elements 
to develop a model of land market participation in a developing economy with exogenous wage rates 
  3and derive prediction regarding the impact of changes in specific variables on land rental market 
participation, and discuss strategies to test these empirically.  
2.1 Evolution of land tenure and markets in China  
Before the communist revolution, most of China’s farmers were poor tenants or owners of small plots 
of land. After taking over, the communist government confiscated large landlords’ holdings and 
distributed land rights to households on an egalitarian basis (Prosterman et al. 1990). In the 1950s, a 
policy of collectivization that required farmers to surrender land to collectives was adopted, with very 
negative consequences for output and rural welfare (Putterman and Skillman 1993, Yao 1999, Lin and 
Yang 2000). To increase production, the 1978 Household Responsibility System (HRS) made 
households residual claimants to output, setting off tremendous increases in output and productivity 
(McMillan et al. 1989, Lin 1992).
1 Structural change since then has been dramatic; agriculture’s 
employment share is estimated to have dropped from more than 70% in 1978 to less than 50% by 
2000 (Johnson 2002), in a process of structural change that is expected to continue in the future.  
Instead of a big-bang reform, the land tenure system that underpinned these changes has evolved in a 
gradual way, often in response to needs. In 1978, villages were urged to issue land use contracts for 
15 years to farmers. However, these contracts often remained verbal and did not preclude reallocation 
of land through administrative fiat in a wide range of circumstances (Rozelle et al. 2002). Land 
transfers were expected to occur through administrative reallocation by village leaders (Kung and Liu 
1997).
2 This not only jeopardized tenure security but, with an increased volume of potential land 
transfers, also gave rise to significant productive inefficiency (Benjamin and Brandt 2002). Initially 
on an informal basis, land transactions started to complement and gradually overtake administrative 
mechanisms (Yao 2000, Kung 2002). However, renting out of land by a migrant or a person engaging 
in local off-farm activities could be perceived as a signal that the land was no longer needed and 
would therefore be available for administrative reallocation (Yang 1997, Brandt et al. 2004). Thus, a 
need to increase tenure security soon emerged as a key precondition for a more active rental market 
that could in turn foster the evolution of a vibrant off-farm sector.  
To respond to this, and encouraged, among others, by results of local land tenure experiments (Kung 
2006), legal measures to strengthen tenure security were gradually put in place. Initially, the 1998 
Land Management Law put rural land use rights on a firmer legal grounding, requiring that farmers 
receive written 30-year land use contracts to strengthen their security and restrict the scope for 
readjustments (Chen and Davis 1998). These provisions were reiterated and tightened by the 2003 
rural land contracting law which further constrained the range of situations under which land could be 
                                                 
1 In urban areas, land was either allocated by the state or long term leases were acquired by private users upon payment of a fee. Land 
acquisition provided advantages by giving owners the ability to participate in the secondary land market, use the land as mortgage, and rent 
it to others. Between 1993 and 1998, the amount transacted annually increased from about 11,000 to almost 1.1 million ha and the amount of 
land mortgaged rose from about 1,000 to 884,000 ha (Ho and Lin 2003). 
2 Exchanges of land within the village were prohibited before the 1986 Land Management Law legalized them. Transfers to outsiders 
remained illegal until allowed in 1998, although without clarifying specific modalities to be followed (Li 2003). 
  4redistributed (Schwarzwalder et al. 2002). In response to higher levels of tenure security and non-
agricultural opportunities, land rental markets, which had been virtually non-existent by the mid-
1990s, emerged rapidly, with more than 10% of rural dwellers engaged in land rental transactions in 
2001 (Deininger and Jin 2005). Opportunities for migration and non-farm employment motivate an 
increasing number of households to move out of agriculture (de Brauw et al. 2000), with far-reaching 
social and economic implications (Zhao 2002). China thus provides an ideal setting to explore factors 
affecting land rental markets and their impact on productivity and household welfare (Liu et al. 1998, 
Zhai and Wang 2002), something that will of particular policy relevance as non-agricultural growth 
picks up in other countries in the region and beyond.  
2.2 Conceptual framework  
The importance of land rental transactions in many settings has given rise to a large literature on 
contract choice discussing the optimum properties of rental contracts in an environment characterized 
by multiple market imperfections and (at least implicitly) unequal ownership distribution of land 
which rental markets help to equalize. Considerable emphasis has been on efforts to reconcile the 
widespread incidence of sharecropping in many parts of the world with the prediction that this 
contractual form to be associated with large inefficiencies. Many studies have focused on identifying 
conditions under which, in an environment characterized by risk and uncertainty, wealth constraints, 
and moral hazard, sharecropping could be a “second” best choice that will be difficult to improve 
upon unless key parameters of the environment are modified (Shetty 1988, Basu 1992, Otsuka et al. 
1992, Laffont and Matoussi 1995, Banerjee et al. 2002, Dubois 2002). Empirically, large amounts of 
evidence have been assembled to quantify the extent to which share contracts will lead to productivity 
losses (Shaban 1987, Otsuka and Hayami 1988, Otsuka et al. 1992, Pender and Fafchamps 2006).  
Although some of this literature accounts for factors that affect tenants’ and landlords’ incentives to 
enter specific contracts, the main focus is on properties of the rental contract rather than the decision 
to rent which is often taken as exogenously given. With increased transfer of labor out of the 
agricultural sector in the context of economic development, the way in which the rural sector responds 
will itself have repercussions for the economy’s productive development and the extent to which rural 
areas will be able to share in such growth. It will thus be useful to complement analysis of contractual 
forms with an assessment of factors that affect overall rental market activity, participation by certain 
types of producers, and the benefits of doing so. This will not only be of conceptual interest but also 
have great policy relevance for the increasing number of countries affected by such a transition.  
To capture factors affecting participation in land rental markets, we use a simple model. Let 
household i be endowed with fixed amounts of labor  i L  and land  i A , and an exogenously given level 
of agricultural ability  i α   (Carter and Yao 2002). Agricultural production follows a production 
function f(αi,,lia,Ai) with standard properties, i.e. f’>0, f’’<0 with respect to all arguments and flA>0.  
  5Labor supervision constraints and the egalitarian distribution of land endowments imply limited scope 
for emergence of agricultural labor markets (Binswanger et al. 1995). Households thus allocate their 
labor between farming on own or leased land li,a and off-farm employment li,o at an exogenously given 
wage w. We abstract from credit market imperfections, noting that these can be overcome through 
appropriately structured rental contracts.
 3 While f(αi,,li,a,Ai) is subject to constant return to scale (e.g. 
 in the Cobb-Douglass case) but that, as ability is not tradable,   
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In the above setting, households’ decision variables are li,a and li,o, the amount of labor devoted to 
farming and wage employment, and the amount of land to be farmed, which implies the amount of 
land rented in or rented out. Renting of land incurs transaction costs which can be different for renting 
in (TC
in) and for renting out (TC
out ). In addition to standard factors such as the cost of acquiring 
information on potential partners as well as negotiating and enforcing contracts,
 an important element 
of transaction cost is the risk of land loss, either due to the tenant’s failure to vacate the land at the end 
of the agreed period or because renting of land increases the risk of being affected by redistribution 
(Rozelle et al. 2002). While search and negotiation costs that are expected to be positively related to 
the size of rental area are the key transaction cost for renting in land, transaction cost associated with 
the risk of land loss the magnitude of which is proportional to the amount of land transacted and 
which can be reduced by appropriate institutional arrangements, is of relevance only for renting out, 
i.e. it will affect only TC
out (Similary assumptions in Kimura et al. 2006)
4. With this, household i’s 
decision problem is to choose Ai, li,a and li,o to solve  
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where, in addition to the variables defined earlier, p is the price of agricultural goods, 
in I is an 
indicator for renting in (1 for rent-in, and 0 otherwise) and 
out I  is a similarly defined indicator for 
renting out (1 for rent-out and 0 otherwise). Assuming that (2) holds with equality, the optimal 
choices, li,a
* and Ai
* solve the first order conditions (FOCs)  
       w A l pf i a i i a li = ) , , ( , , α     (3)   
and for households who rent in (A
* >  i A ),      (4) 
in
i a i i A TC r A l pf
i + = ) , , ( , α
                                                 
3 The notion that households are able to structure rental contracts flexibly to overcome liquidity constraints is supported by the fact that, 
according to our data, 86% of contracts at the national level, and more than 90% in the poor Southwestern provinces, involve rental payment 
at harvest time.  
4 While the positive relationship between transaction cost and area of transaction is not necessarily in exact proportion, however, we treat 
the transaction cost for either side of the markets as variable cost to simplify the derivation of our propositions without loss of generality.  
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and for autarkic households (A
* =  i A ),      (6) 
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Comparative statics based on equations (3)-(6) allow us to derive propositions on the relationship 
between households’ land endowment and their level of agricultural ability and thus the impact of 
land rental on productivity, the response of land rentals to changes in transaction costs, and their 
evolution with increases in wage rates that provide the basic hypotheses to be tested empirically with 
our data. More detailed proofs for each of the propositions below can be found in the appendix. 
Proposition 1: The amount of land rented in (out) is strictly increasing (decreasing) in households’ 
agricultural ability, αi, and strictly decreasing (increasing) in their land endowment  i A . Land rental 
will transfer land to efficient, but land-poor producers thereby contributing to higher levels of 
productivity and more efficient factor use in the economy. For households renting in or out land, this 
proposition can be derived by totally differentiating both sides of equations (3) and (4) or (3) and (5) 
with respect to αi or  i A . Manipulating terms yields ∂Ai
*/∂αi >0 (or ∂Ai
*/∂ A  <0). Since ai
in or ai
out, the 
amount rented in or rented out is defined as either Ai
*- i A  or  i A- Ai
*, the result for ai
in and ai
out follows.  
Proposition 2: The presence of transaction costs defines two critical levels of ability αl(TC
out, ..) and 
αu(TC
in, ..) such that households with ability αi∈[αl, αu] will remain in autarky. Any increase in TC
in 
or TC
out will expand the autarky range, thus reducing the number of producers participating in rental 
markets and the number of efficiency-enhancing land transactions. Compared to a situation with no 
transaction cost, this will decrease productivity and social welfare. To see this, note that the cutoff 
points αl and αu can be obtained from (5) and (4) by setting Ai*= i A  and li,a=  where   is autarkic 
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u . Simple differentiation with respect to the 
transaction cost variable then yields the result of interest.  
Proposition 3: Increases of the exogenously given wage for off-farm employment will imply that 
higher amounts of land are transacted in rental markets as households with low agricultural ability 
who join the off-farm labor market will supply more land. This will lead to a decrease in the 
equilibrium rental rate which will prompt those with high-ability (who specialize in agricultural 
production) to rent in more land.  
To simplify derivation for this proposition, assume without loss of generality that there are n 
households in the economy who are endowed with identical amounts of land and labor A  and L  but 
  7who differ in farming ability αi which is uniformly distributed between α  and α . To be able to 
derive a closed form solution, we also abstract from transaction costs (i.e. let TC
in=TC
out=0) and use 
an explicit functional form  . Finally, we assume that, due to fixed setup costs, 
households will give up agricultural production completely and rent out all their land if the amount of 
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* in terms of α, β, w, and r. As A
* is proportional to households’ farming 
ability α. The market clearing condition (∫ =
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c allows to solve for the critical level of ability αc below which households will rent out 
all their land endowment. For households who continue farm production, we solve for the new 
optimal operational land size (A
**) and new rental rate (r
**) based on (7), (8) and the new market 





A n d A
* * ). Setting A A =
* * allows us to obtain αau, the level of farming ability 
by households who remain autarkic. Taking derivatives of αc, A
**, αau and r
** with respect to w then 
yields ∂αc/∂w>0, ∂A
**/∂w>0, ∂αau/∂w<0 and ∂r
**/∂w<0, suggesting that, as off-farm opportunities 
increase (i) a larger number of households will give farm production and rent out all their endowment; 
(ii) the equilibrium rental rate will decrease; (iii) those who remain in agricultural production will 
cultivate more land; and (iv) a larger number of households will rent in land. 
2.3 Estimation strategy  
Testing the above predictions quantitatively require measures of agricultural ability and transaction 
costs. To obtain a measure for the former, we estimate a production function with household fixed 
effects. Let technology be represented by the Cobb-Douglas production function 
) exp( ) exp(
4 3 2 1 t X K L A Q ijt ijt ijt ijt j i ijt φ α α
θ θ θ θ + =       (9) 
where Qijt is the value of agricultural output produced by household i in village j in year t; Aijt, Lijt and 
Kijt, Xijt are total cultivated area, labor for crop production, value of agricultural assets, and amounts of 
chemical fertilizer, organic manure, pesticides, and seeds used in production, θ1, θ2, θ3, and θ4 are 
                                                 
5 To keep notation manageable, we drop the household index i below.   
  8technical coefficients to be estimated, αj is a time invariant village level efficiency parameter that 
reflects, among others, access to markets, infrastructure, and other factors that change only slowly 
such as climate, αi is the time invariant household fixed effect which serves as our measure of ability, 
and t is a time dummy so that exp(φt) measures productivity changes over time. To estimate (9), we 
take logarithms of both sides, add an iid error term, and let αij = αi +αj to obtain  
qijt = αij +θ1aijt + θ2 lijt + θ3 kijt + θ4 xijt + φt + εijt     (10) 
where a, l, and k denote the logarithms of A, L, and K with appropriate subscripts. With multiple 
observations per household, we can subtract the means of relevant variables. Let ~ denote a demeaned 
variable (i.e.  ij ijt ijt q q q − = ~ ), we have 
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt t x k l a q ε φ θ θ θ θ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
4 3 2 1 + + + + + =        (11)
6
This allows us to estimate all θs and φ and recover an estimate of composite efficiency parameter αij 
which includes household’s idiosyncratic farming ability and unobserved village characteristics such 
as infrastructure access. Noting that the village effect can be defined as the average of all household 
fixed effects in the village, i.e.   (Mundlak 1961) allows us to obtain an estimate of 
ability for each producer in the sample by subtracting 
∑ =
i
j ij j n / ) ˆ ( ˆ α α
j α ˆ from  ij α ˆ .  
A second empirical issue to be addressed is to specify an appropriate econometric framework and to 
parameterize transaction costs. According to our model, rental market participation will depend on the 
households’ endowments of land ( A ) and family labor (L ), their assets (K), and opportunities for 
off-farm employment (O). Let g(α, A, L , K, O) be a household’s net earning function that includes all 
farm and non-farm earning activities except the net rental income including transaction costs for 
market participants, and g’(a, A , L ,K,O) be the first derivative of g(a, A, L , K, O) with respect to 
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where A
*
i denotes the optimal operational land size. This switching regime model can be estimated 
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6 Note that  ij α ~  disappears as αij is constant for household i in community j over time, so  0 ~ = ij α . 
  9While similar approaches to market participation have been taken by other studies (Goetz 1992, Key 
et al. 2000, Carter and Yao 2002, Bellemare and Barrett 2006), our approach differs from these in that 
we treat the thresholds as functions of policy variables, something that allows us to explicitly assess 
the impact of these variables on demand for and supply of land to the rental market. In terms of our 
theoretical model, doing so is justified by the fact that these policy variables will affect transaction 
costs r(.) but are unlikely to affect individual producers’ marginal product g’(.). At the same time, the 
fact that information on the amount of land rented was not included in our data before 2005 and is 
quite noisy even for this year precludes us from modeling the quantity of land transacted conditional 
on rental market participation.   
Under the assumption that g’(α, A ,L ,K,O), r(TC
in) and r(TC
out) are linear, this can be expressed as 
  g’(α,  A , L ,K,O)= β0 + β1α + β2 A  + β3L  + β4K + β5O     (14) 
r(TC
in) = δ0 + δ1Si         (15) 
 r(TC
out) = η0 +η1 So         (16).  
The switching regression or ordered probit model defined by these equations is estimated by full 
information maximum likelihood. Households’ endowments of land and labor are represented by the 
total amount of land to which they have use rights, the head’s age, and the number of family members 
14 to 60 years of age. K is represented by the value of assets at the beginning of the year. Village per 
capita income and the head’s level of education are used to approximate O.  
The upper and lower threshold functions r(TC
in) and r(TC
out) will be affected by economic and 
institutional factors. The former are approximated by the per capita land endowment in the village and 
the share of adults in the village who on average, had migrated out of the province in the 3-years prior 
to t. Higher levels of out-migration will increase supply of land to rental markets, thereby reducing 
search costs for those seeking to rent in. Greater endowments with land at the village level are likely 
to reduce transaction costs for renting-in but increase them for renting-out.  
Institutional variables include whether the village allows land to be rented to households from outside 
the village, whether there is a rule mandating that land that has is left uncultivated for one season is be 
taken back by local authorities, and whether households have land use certificates to document their 
land rights. Limitations on renting to outsiders are expected to increase the costs of renting out but, to 
the extent that they may cause landlords to divert supply to the local leasing market, may reduce the 
cost of renting in. Rules stipulating the return of non-cultivated land to the village could increase 
supply of land available for rental and thus reduce the cost of renting in despite the fact that it reduces 
the level of tenure security. Having a land use certificate is expected to reduce the costs of land loss 
for landlords renting out, thus increasing their propensity for doing so.  
2.4 Productivity impact of rental markets  
  10While coefficients on households’ ability, the level of village income, and transaction cost variables 
allow us to test predictions from on factors affecting rental market participation, quantification of the 
impact of rental markets on occupational diversification, land use productivity, and household welfare, 
will require additional evidence. The most direct way to obtain estimates of productivity effects is to 
compare returns obtained from the same plot before and after it has been rented. Equivalently, impacts 
on occupational structure and household welfare can be obtained by comparing the main source of 
income and the amount of income received by households before and after renting land.  
One issue that makes it difficult to obtain such information is that in many cases, especially if the 
landlord has migrated out, it will not be possible to obtain such information form the person actually 
concerned. In this case, the only practical way of obtaining it is to enquire from those currently in 
possession of the land. As potential renters or tenants will explore different options before deciding 
for a specific partner, and as in the local village economy such information is readily available 
(Lanjouw 1999, DeSilva 2000), we obtain this information from tenants or landlords for their partner.  
3. Data sources and descriptive evidence 
We test the predictions from our model, using a large panel survey of agricultural producers in China. 
Standard household and production information is complemented with information on institutional 
arrangements at the village level and details of rental transactions, characteristics of the other party, 
and changes in productivity on a given plot.  
3.1 Sampling and data collection instruments  
Our empirical investigation is based on three sources of data. First, household level information is 
from a 2002-05 panel survey of almost 8,000 households in slightly less than 800 villages in nine of 
China’s most important agricultural provinces by the Rural Survey Team of China’s National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS) jointly with the World Bank. Sample households are included in NBS’ ongoing 
consumption survey, implying that a wide range of information on demography, assets, income, 
expenditure, agricultural production, and land market participation is available. Among others, this 
allows estimation of a panel production function to derive agricultural ability as discussed above. This 
is complemented by information on average incomes, endowments, and institutional arrangements 
(e.g. land use regulations, restrictions on land rental to outsiders, the share of households with land 
use certificates) at the village level collected in a separate survey administered to local leaders. As 
much of the relevant information is either available from administrative records or, as in the case of 
rules and regulations, can be recalled rather easily, it has been collected from 1999 onwards.  
Finally, to document the contribution of land rental to structural change, a follow-up survey was 
administered to those who had actually been involved in land transactions to assess the impact of land 
rental participation on welfare of participants. This survey collected detailed information on the 
contractual arrangements for land transfers, the amount of net revenue obtained from the land before it 
  11had been rented, and details of the other party involved in the contract, including his current and past 
occupation status and income level.  
3.2 Descriptive statistics  
Descriptive statistics for key variables included in the analysis at the national and regional level,
7 as 
reported in table 1, point towards differences in income, migration, endowments, and policy variables 
across regions, in addition to highlighting the increasingly important role of land markets. Households 
have on average 4 members each, 3 of them in working age, and a head of about 46 years. While 
primary education is almost universal, 52% and 18% of households have a head with secondary or 
high school education, respectively. Schooling attainment is lower in the Southwest (46% with 
secondary and 9% with high school), followed by the Center (45% and 18%, respectively) and the 
North and Coast regions. The mean per capita land endowment is 1.68 mu
8, a figure that ranges from 
1.13 in the Southwest to 2.30 in the Northeast. The amount of non-land assets, about 27,000 Y
9 on 
average, varies significantly across provinces, from 36,000 in the Coast to 17,000 in the Southwest, 
the country’s poorest region. With a contribution of about 58% to total income, agriculture remains 
the most important source of income overall, ranging from almost two thirds (63%) in the Southwest 
to slightly less than half of the income in the Coast. 
With a Gini coefficient of 0.41 for “owned” land, within-village variation of endowments is more 
limited than in other countries, e.g. in India or Brazil where the corresponding coefficients are 0.75 or  
0.89, respectively (Deininger and Squire 1998). Still, 13% and 10%, respectively, of households in 
our sample rented in/out land during 2002-2004, a significant increase from earlier figures (Deininger 
and Jin 2005). As commonly found in household-based surveys where some landlord households may 
have migrated, a slightly higher share of households report to rent in land.  
While about 60% of those participating in rental markets reported to have a contract, the majority of 
land transactions remain of an informal nature, as evidenced by the fact that less than 10% of these 
contracts are written and three quarters are open ended rather than having a pre-specified length (of 
slightly less than 3 years on average for those with a time frame). Interestingly, almost 40% of renters 
rent in from a relative, a percentage that is, with almost 60%, particularly high in the Northeast and 
the Southwest, two regions where an almost equally share level of households rent to relatives (65% 
in the Southwest and 56% in the Northeast).  
Village level data point towards significant differences in the share of households with at least one 
migrant, about 18% overall, ranging from 25% in the Center to 10% in the Northeast. The share of 
migrants who crossed provincial boundaries is, with 17%, lowest in the Coast but exceeds two thirds 
                                                 
7 The four regions are defined as follows: North and Northeast includes Liaoning and Henan provinces, Coastal Zhejiang and Shandong, the 
Center Henan and Hubei, and the Southwest Hunan, Sichuan and Guizhou provinces. 
8 One mu equals 1/15
th of a hectare. 
9 At the time of the survey, the exchange rate was approximately 8 Y to the US dollar.  
  12in the Center. With participation rates of 21% and 15%, rental is most active in the Central and 
Southwest regions where levels of overall and inter-provincial migration are also highest, in line with 
evidence that in many cases migration opportunities trigger rental market participation (Kung 2002).  
It is also of interest to note institutional differences across regions. First, although the 1998 land law 
mandates issuance of land use certificates to everybody, only 82% of households in the sample -less 
than three fourth in the Northeast but more than 92% in the Southwest- reported to possess such a 
certificate. Second, about 14% of villages had, in 2001, a policy of prohibiting land rental to non-
residents, a share that varied from 26% in the Coast to 5% in the Southwest. Finally, partly reflecting 
different land availability, about 10% of villages, ranging from 4% in the Southwest to 16% in at the 
Coast, had a policy allowing the village to take back land left uncultivated for one season.  
3.3 Differences by type of land market participation  
Splitting the sample by type of rental market participation between those remaining in autarky and 
those renting in and out, respectively, provides a fist descriptive check of our hypotheses. Results 
from doing so, reported in table 2, yield three insights. First, in line with proposition 1, and contrary to 
fears of markets leading to large-scale land concentration, higher land and lower labor endowments 
increase the propensity to rent out, suggesting that rental markets tend to equalize factor ratios across 
households similar to what had earlier been intended by administrative reallocation. The mean per 
capita land endowment for those renting out was 2.1 mu, compared to 1.5 mu for those renting in. The 
head’s age for households who rent out is slightly higher than for those who rent in land.  
Second, those better endowed with human and physical capital are more likely to supply land to the 
rental market. In fact the mean asset endowment of households renting out is about one third higher 
than that of households renting in, in addition to those renting out having slightly higher levels of 
tertiary education. Although income levels for those renting in are still significantly below those for 
rent-out household, the difference is less pronounced than for assets, suggesting that land rental 
provides an opportunity for the poor to catch up. Finally, there is evidence that rental markets 
contribute to higher levels of occupational diversification. Although the share of household income 
from agriculture remains, with 53%, high even for those renting out land, it is significantly lower than 
for those renting in who derive almost two thirds (65%) of their income from agricultural activity. 
This is also reflected in the fact that those renting out receive significantly higher shares of income 
than those renting in from migration and transfers (24% vs. 19%), wages (12% vs. 7%), and non-farm 
self-employment (11% vs. 9%) with all of the differences being statistically significant at the 1% level.  
4. Empirical evidence  
Comparing changes in productivity for rented to autarkic plots points towards large productivity gains. 
These in turn translate into a very positive impact of rental on household welfare, diversification of 
livelihoods, and productivity of land use. About 30% of sampled tenants increased their income, 69% 
  13remained in the same bracket, and only 1% moved down with corresponding figures for “landlords” 
of 45%, 54% and 1%, respectively. Econometric evidence points towards a number of factors that 
tend to limit participation in land rental markets and thus should be of interest for policy makers.  
4.1 Impact on productivity, welfare, and occupational diversification  
Data on net revenues excluding family labor from a plot before and after it had been transferred 
through rental markets in table 3 support the hypotheses of significant improvements in productivity 
through land rental. With a gain of 267 or 283 Y/mu amounting to an increase in net revenues of 84% 
or 83%,
10 figures obtained form tenants and landlords, respectively, are surprisingly consistent.
11 
With rents, including taxes, of some 90 Y/mu, about two thirds of the surplus from land rental accrues 
to tenants and one third to those renting out. With a mean of 3 mu per land transaction, the increase in 
net income for the tenant due to rental market participation would amount to about 550 Y.  
While the simple difference used above eliminates unobservable plot-level effects such as soil quality, 
the estimated productivity impact of land rental will suffer from upward bias if productivity increased 
over time in an independent manner as well. To adjust for this, we pool data for changes in net income 
as reported by rental market participants with the difference in net revenue between 2001 and 2004 
(Δy) for the 6100 households who remained in autarky throughout the period.
12 Using the 7,968 
households in the pooled sample to run a regression of the form Δy =α0+α1R
in+α2R
out+βD where D 
denotes regional dummies allows us to recover the increase in productivity for rented plots compared 
to those that remained in self cultivation while holding constant for regional effects. Doing so indeed 
points towards slightly smaller productivity increase of 186 Y/mu for rented in and 180 Y/mu for 
rented out plots, i.e. an increase in productivity of slightly below 60%.
13  
To assess the extent to which land rental can help diversify income sources and develop the non-farm 
economy, we compare information on changes in the main income source for landlords and income 
brackets for both parties involved in rental transactions before and after land had been transferred. The 
sample used consists of the 1106 households who actually had participated in land rentals and their 
partners. Evidence on changes in the main income source for households renting out land as presented 
in table 4 supports the notion that such markets help to promote a considerable occupational shift. 
Before renting out land, the vast majority (57%) in this group relied on agriculture, followed by local 
non-farm employment (23%) and migration (20%). The ability to engage in land rental completely 
                                                 
10 If both apply equivalent amounts of family labor, the change in net revenue is equivalent to an increase in productivity. As, with 81 versus 
91 days per mu, renters actually spend slightly less time on agricultural activities than autarkic cultivators, this assumption seems justified.  
11 Recall that, in cases where the landlord migrated out, asking the tenant is the only feasible way of obtaining such information. As we are 
using brackets and broad job categories, information obtained from both partners in the pre-test for cases where doing so was feasible was 
internally very consistent.  
12 If higher managerial ability by rent-in households imply a systematic difference in the rate, rather than just the level of productivity 
growth, this estimate may still be biased. As information on agricultural inputs is available only at the household level, it was not possible to 
conduct the more appropriate comparison between changes in net revenue for owned and rented in plots by the same household.  
13 The regression has high predictive power (R
2 of 0.56) and we are unable to reject equality of the two coefficients. Use of region dummies 
is supported by significant differences in estimated net gains from rental across regions, the magnitude of which is quite consistent between 
assessments by tenants and landlords. 
  14changed this; after renting out land, the share of households deriving their main income from 
migration had increased by 35 points to 55%, followed by 29% in local off-farm employment, and 
only 17% who remain in agricultural production, i.e., a total of 40 points less than before land rental 
who remained in agricultural production. Inspection of the transition matrix highlights that virtually 
all of the change was due to households shifting out of full-time agricultural production into migration 
(33 points) and local non-farm employment (8 points), complemented by a modest shift from non-
farm employment to migration (3%).  
To obtain a better understanding of welfare effects from land rental, we present levels of net per capita 
income in broad categories before and after land rental for households renting out (table 5) and those 
renting in (table 6). For the former, we note that rental participation was associated with significant 
income gains. 45% moved up by at least one category, 54% remained in the same category, and less 
than 1% moved down. While the need to rely on ranges rather than exact figures makes it impossible 
to compute the impact on average incomes, we note that the share of landlord households with a per 
capita income of less than 1,500 Y dropped by 20 points, from 30% to 10%, consistent with evidence 
that it is those with the lowest asset endowments who engage in migration (Deininger and Jin 2006). 
The level of upward mobility is also illustrated by the fact that the share of households with incomes 
above 3,000 Y increased from 26% to 47% of the total.  
While recognizing that those renting out are likely to gain, policy makers in China have often been 
concerned that greater reliance on impersonal market forces may negatively affect equity as those 
renting in will need to pay for it, contrary to administrative reallocation where land was available “for 
free”. The earlier evidence on productivity impacts of land rental suggests that the requirement to pay 
for land may actually facilitate productivity increases that would be difficult to accomplish under a 
system relying purely on administrative reallocation. Indeed, the transition matrix of tenants’ income 
before and after renting in land points towards considerable improvements; although some two thirds 
remained in the same income bracket, about one third moved up and only about 1% moved down.
14 
With the majority of impacts concentrated at the bottom of the distribution, these changes had a 
positive distributional impact: the share of households in the poorest group (< 1,500 Y) declined from 
21% to 10%, another 5 point decrease is observed in the share of households in the 1,500-3,000 Y 
bracket, and the share of those obtaining more than 3,000 Y increased from 27% to 42%.  
While this illustrates that rental markets can provide significant benefits, it is unclear whether they 
capitalized fully on existing potential or fell short of realizing it. To provide descriptive evidence on 
this, households were asked whether they ever had wanted to rent out (or in) more than they could 
obtain in the market and whether they feel confident that in the future they will be able to use rental to 
                                                 
14 The fact that these households had been included in our sample before also allows us to cross-check the information provided by the other 
party (in this case landlords) with historical data from a high quality household survey. Doing so points towards high levels of consistency, 
with a slightly lower share (52%) whose income had stayed in the same bracket, an almost equal share (31%) who had moved up by at least 
one bracket, and a somewhat higher share whose income bracket had decreased (17%). 
  15fully adjust to their desired level of operational land holding. Responses, in the bottom panel of table 
3, suggest friction on demand and supply sides. Almost 40% indicate that they had been demand-
constrained at some point in the past while 12% wanted to supply more land than the market could 
absorb. More than 80% indicated that the 2003 rural land contracting law (RLCL) has made transfers 
of land through the market easier, although it did not fully eliminate constraints to participation. In 
fact, the share of households who are “not confident” about being able to rent in their desired amount 
is, with 45%, slightly above the share of those who experienced rationing in the past and 23% report 
concerns about not being able to rent out the most desirable amount of land in the future.  
A common assumption in the literature is that, if tenure is insecure, households will rent land only to 
close relations (Macours et al. 2004) to reduce the potential for of enforcement problems due to, for 
example, the tenant failing to return the land upon expiration of the contract.
15 The finding that 
despite legal provisions to the contrary, land reallocations by village leaders continued at surprisingly 
high rates  suggests that, at least in some cases, such concerns about tenure security may indeed 
continue to be of relevance (Deininger et al. 2006). To assess whether this may be an issue, we 
compare the net increase in productivity due to the land transfer between those renting to relatives and 
those transacting with non-relatives.
16 Results, displayed in table 7, suggest significant and large 
differences, with net gains from renting to non-relatives almost 80% higher than for transactions with 
relatives. While part of the gap could be explained by imperfect information or altruistic motives, the 
size of the figures points towards high levels of unrealized potential.  
4.2 Econometric results  
To complement the descriptive evidence, provide a more direct test of the hypotheses noted earlier, 
and identify the extent to which institutional factors systematically increase transaction costs and thus 
can explain the rather high levels of rationing, we estimate the ordered probit model discussed earlier 
using pooled data. Table 8 reports results from the marginal product equation in the top panel, and 
from the lower and upper bounds between leasing out and autarky and autarky and leasing in, 
respectively in the middle and bottom panel  
The marginal product equation provides a number of insights. First, the large and significant 
coefficients on households’ land (negative) and labor (positive) endowments suggest that land rental 
helps to equalize factor ratios by transferring this factor from land-abundant and labor poor 
households to those with little land and large amounts of labor. There is thus little basis for the 
argument that land rental would lead to concentration of land. Second, the negative coefficient on per 
capita village income, our proxy for local wage rates, highlights that availability of other economic 
opportunities increase land rental supply. This increases households’ propensity to rent out and makes 
                                                 
15 Alternatively, in the Chinese context, reliance on transfers within the family could reduce the likelihood of the land being expropriated by 
village leaders. 
16 As neither of these issues is a concern for tenants, tenure security would be expected to be an issue only for landlords wanting to rent out.  
  16them less likely to rent in, thereby allowing those who participate to obtain increased amounts of land. 
The negative and weakly significant coefficient on a dummy of the head having high school education 
provides some support for the notion that households with greater off-farm opportunities may be more 
likely to rent out. Although not directly related to our model, the negative and highly significant 
coefficient on households’ initial asset endowment suggests that it is the poor with high levels of 
agricultural ability who are able to obtain land through the rental markets. Furthermore, as predicted 
by our model, those with higher levels of agricultural ability are more likely to rent in land (col. 2).
17 
To interpret the coefficient, we note that, compared to the least efficient household, the most efficient 
household in the sample is 33% more likely to rent in or 5% less likely to rent out. The negative 
coefficient on age squared also suggests that, by shifting land to younger producers, land rental helps 
to redistribute land across generations.  
Lower and upper bound equations support the hypotheses that migration helps to stimulate land rental 
markets, that greater tenure security will increase supply of land to rental markets but not demand, 
and that local regulations affecting the cost of transferring land will affect producers’ entry into rental 
markets. As it reduces the amount of labor available, higher village level migration is estimated to 
increase supply of land to rental and the demand for such land.
18 As expected, greater availability of 
land in the village reduces the propensity to rent-out and makes it easier to rent-in. The significance of 
having a land certificate for renting out is consistent with the notion that limited levels of tenure 
security continue to constrain households from supplying their land to rental markets and that 
issuance of an ‘official’ document to codify their ownership makes them more confident in doing so.  
As to the impact of village-level regulations, rules that put limits on rental to outsiders are estimated 
to be a significant factor reducing households’ propensity to supply land to rental markets although 
they have no discernible impact on participation on the demand side. Somewhat surprisingly, land use 
regulations that allow village leaders to confiscate land that has not been utilized for one season are 
estimated to have a very significant impact on the propensity for rental market participation on either 
the supply or the demand sides. The size of the coefficient -much larger than that for possession of a 
land use certificate and equivalent to migration of about one third of workers in the village- highlights 
that, especially after abolition of land taxes eliminated financial incentives for effective land use, local 
regulations against speculation may actually help activate land markets.  
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
By complementing the focus on the productive performance of different types of rental contracts with 
an emphasis on the determinants of rental market participation in a growing economy as well as the 
                                                 
17 As there are about 1,000 observations for whom we can not estimate ability due to lack of production activity, we report specifications 
with and without ability. As we lack information on inputs and outputs for rented plots separately, systematically lower productivity on 
rented plots would lead to a downward bias on our the coefficient on ability, implying that the estimate constitutes a lower bound.  
18 This is consistent with the notion that cash constraints that could be alleviated through remittances are not a key factor affecting rental 
market participation.  
  17impact of such arrangements, this paper provides analytical and an empirical insights. Analytically, 
we show that, in the situation at hand, higher non-agricultural wages will create a pathway for 
development that can complement agricultural intensification and land-related investment considered 
by traditional models. To make most effective use of such opportunities, security against eviction to 
provide incentives for an optimum level of land-related investment will need to be combined with a 
level of tenure security and transfer rights to allow at least temporary transfers of land use to others.  
Our empirical evidence suggests that the gains in allocative efficiency and productivity of land use 
that can be realized through rental markets in a growing economy can be large, with productivity 
increases of some 60%. In our case, these translate into improvements in tenants’ welfare of some 
25%, and even larger increases in landlords’ income. The magnitude of these impacts significantly 
exceeds those commonly estimated to arise from altering the bargaining power within a given contract, 
thus suggesting that studying determinants of rental market participation may usefully complement 
the large literature on contract choice. This is of particular interest as our data point towards a positive 
distributional impact, consistent with evidence that in many situations it is the poor who are more 
likely to participate in rental markets as well as migration.  
Although this points towards a very positive impact of land rental markets, we find that the level of 
rental market activity in our study area remains considerably below optimum. If concerns about tenure 
security prompt households to refrain from participating in land rental or to limit rental transactions to 
relatives, the productivity and equity benefits from land rental will be reduced or entirely forgone. 
While successive reforms increased security of land use rights and improve land market functioning, 
tenure insecurity remains an important concern voiced by survey respondents, many of whom 
consider their level of land market participation to be constrained. Additional efforts to increase 
tenure security, by clarifying the legal situation, improving enforcement, and possibly formalizing 
local systems of land registration may thus have a beneficial impact on land markets. Such measures 
may be particularly important as a secular decline in the economic importance of the agricultural 
sector is likely to increase the potential for efficiency-enhancing land transactions.  
While our data show that operation of land rental markets will provide significant direct benefits and 
that policies to increase tenure security have great potential to further enhance these, they do not allow 
us to make inferences on the precise ways through which such an impact comes about. (e.g. under-
utilization of productive land by migrant households). By linking functioning of land rental markets 
explicitly to migration decisions, follow-up work could help to probe more specifically into this issue, 
identify some of the indirect impacts of both phenomena, and distinguish more clearly between the 
contribution of land markets and that of other policy factors. As these issues will have far-reaching 
implications for the transfer of labor from the agricultural sector and the development of rural areas 
far beyond China, they are of high priority for future research.  
  18Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
  Entire   By Regions 
 Sample  N&NE  Coastal  Centre  SW 
Household characteristics & rental 
participation        
Household  size  3.94  3.89 3.69 4.14 4.03 
Members aged 15-60 years  2.99  2.97  2.88  3.15  2.93 
Head’s  age  46.56  46.85 46.34 46.59 46.25 
Head with secondary education  (%)  52.12  58.98 55.31 45.12 45.84 
Head with high school education  (%)  18.30  21.02 23.74 17.62  9.41 
Households renting in (%) 13.49  10.72  8.43  20.50  14.55 
Households renting out (%)  9.81  6.15  10.76 13.68 10.53 
Assets and income        
Total owned land (mu)  6.24  8.41  5.29  5.51  4.31 
Owned land per capita (mu)  1.68  2.30  1.49  1.42  1.13 
Value of total assets (Y)  27166  29992  36183  24244  17404 
Per  capita  income  2983  3022 4184 2677 2158 
 of which from agri. (%)  58.38  60.91  49.42  57.59  63.43 
 of which from wage (%) 15.00  18.32  22.88  7.96  10.43 
 of which from migration (%)   11.21  6.42  9.98  16.77  13.85 
 of which from non-farm self emp.(%)  10.92  10.8  13.11  12.03  7.73 
 of which from transfer (%)  4.49  3.55  4.61  5.65  4.57 
Renting in         
Renting in from relative (%)   39.32  58.59 25.86 35.08 54.43 
Share with contract, incl. oral ones (%)  59.44  37.84 57.08 66.50 55.70 
Share of contracts, written  7.78  18.46  24.44  1.67  3.41 
Share with fixed term (%)  24.15  30.61 29.20 21.08 22.78 
 if yes, length of term (years)  2.71  3.82 3.80 2.11 1.57 
Renting out         
Renting out to relative (%)   31.04  55.81 24.29 23.18 64.58 
Share with contract, incl. oral ones (%)  59.29  22.73 50.00 75.00 47.92 
Share of contracts, written  8.63  0.00  13.89  6.55  13.04 
Share with fixed term (%)  26.61  34.09 22.14 28.77 22.92 
 if yes, length of term (years)  2.92  1.60  3.06  3.19  2.73 
Village characteristics & land policy         
Village per capita land endow. (mu)  1.33  1.84 1.30 1.02 0.88 
Villager per capita income (Y)  2256.26  2306.15 3229.46 1930.47 1649.44 
Share of members migrating  (%)  17.83  10.05 17.07 24.85 22.03 
 Of which, % migrating out of  province  39.61  27.27 17.60 61.08 51.03 
Have land certificate (%)  81.16  73.92  83.05  81.33  92.02 
Renting to outsiders not allowed (%)  13.53  16.60  25.74  6.90  4.83 
Uncultivated land taken away (%)  9.74  9.08  15.72  10.22  4.09 
No  of  observations  19570  6622 3533 5187 4228 
Source: Own computation from NBS/World Bank land market survey 
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Table 2: Household and village characteristics by rental status 
  Type of household  
  Rent-in   Autarkic   Rent-out  
Household characteristics      
Owned land (mu)  5.60***  6.18  7.65*** 
Owned land per capita (mu)  1.47***  1.67  2.10*** 
Household size  4.02*  3.94  3.87* 
Members 15-60 years old  3.06*  2.99  2.90* 
Head’s age  45.82**  46.62  47.11** 
Head with secondary education. (%)  50.09**  52.88  48.62*** 
Head with high school education. (%)  16.47*  18.74  17.21*** 
Assets and income     
Value of total assets (Y)  24,039***  27,417  29,467*** 
Per capital net income (Y)  2734.14***  3003.06  3168.60*** 
Share of income from agriculture (%)  64.73***  61.00  53.06*** 
Share of inc. from wage (%)  7.31***  11.85  12.29*** 
Share of inc. from migration (%)   18.78*  17.98  23.65*** 
Share of inc. non-farm self emp.(%)  9.17  9.17  11.01** 
Agricultural Ability  0.049  -0.016  -0.007 
Source: Own computation from NBS/World Bank land market survey 
T-Test was conducted to compare the group mean of the tested group versus the mean of autarkic group;  
*, **, *** significantly different from the sample mean at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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Total 
Sample N&NE  Coast  Central  SW 
Tenants’ assessment        
Profit before transfer (Y/mu)  317.65  257.07  430.00  302.31  274.95 
Profit after transfer (Y/mu)  584.74  710.8  793.29  530.29  399.01 
Productivity gain through rental (Y/mu)    267.09  453.73 363.29 227.98 124.06 
Productivity gain through rental  (%)  84.08  176.51  84.49 75.41 45.12 
 of which to tenant (%)  65.33  71.76  57.23  68.75  54.85 
 of which to owner (%)  34.67  28.24  42.58  31.25  45.15 
Land owners’ assessment        
Profit generated by owner before transfer  (Y/mu)  340.93  184.31 434.03 324.59 285.81 
Profit after transfer (Y/mu)  623.9  593.55  770.21  566.87  486.4 
Productivity increase through rental (Y/mu)   282.97  409.24  336.18  242.28  200.59 
Productivity gain through rental  (%)  83.00  222.04  77.46 74.64 70.18 
 of which to tenant (%)  65.46  76.46  58.28  69.22  59.58 
 of which to owner (%)  34.47  24.12  41.42  30.64  40.42 
Actual & perceived constraints to rental         
Tenants rationed in the past (%)  39.02  51.32 36.20 35.92 33.67 
Tenants thinking RLCL improved market functioning  81.34  83.96 91.93 75.38 76.25 
Owners rationed in the past (%)  12.24  8.33  7.33  15.63  15.24 
Owners thinking RLCL improved market functioning  81.44  89.74 96.43 61.06 92.59 
Tenants having doubts about future  (%)  44.54  65.79 36.20 40.99 35.71 
Owners having doubts about future  (%)  22.98  20.72 19.73 24.74 25.00 
Source: Own calculation based on NBS/World Bank survey  
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 Before 
After  Agric. production  Local non-farm  Migration  Total 
Agric. production  15.91%  0.63%  0.18%  16.73% 
Local  non-farm  8.32% 19.80% 0.45% 28.57% 
Migration 32.91%  2.62%  19.17%  54.70% 
Total 57.14%  23.06%  19.80%  100.00% 





Table 5: Per capita net income of lease-out households before and after transfer  
  Before  
After   <1500 Y  1500-3000 Y  3000-5000 Y  >5000 Y  Total 
<1500  Y  9.84% 0.63% 0.09% 0.00%  10.56% 
1500-3000 Y  17.42%  24.82%  0.09%  0.00%  42.33% 
3000-5000  Y  1.81% 15.97%  12.82% 0.09% 30.69% 
>5000  Y  1.08% 1.99% 6.95% 6.41%  16.43% 
Total  30.14% 43.41% 19.95%  6.50% 100.00% 





Table 6: Per capita net income of lease-in households before and after transfer  
 Before   
After   <1500 Y  1500-3000 Y  3000-5000 Y  >5000 Y  Total 
<1500  Y 10.57%  0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  10.57% 
1500-3000 Y  10.34%  36.78%  0.69%  0.00%  47.82% 
3000-5000  Y  0.00% 15.17%  17.01% 0.69% 32.87% 
>5000  Y  0.00% 0.00% 4.60% 4.14% 8.74% 
Total  20.92% 51.95% 22.30%  4.83% 100.00% 





Table 7: Gains from land rental by transaction partner 
  Renting out to  
   Relative Non-relative 
Profit after transfer (Y/mu)  512.08  685.99 
Profit before transfer (Y/mu)  326.25  347.60 
Net gain (Y/mu)  185.83  339.99 
Net gain to tenants (Y/mu)  128.27  223.99 
Net gain to owners (Y/mu)  57.56  115.53 
% of benefit to tenants  69.03  65.88 
% of benefit to owners  30.97  34.12 
Source: Own calculation based on NBS/World Bank survey  
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 Specification 
 Without  ability With  ability 
Agricultural ability    0.402*** 
(8.89) 
































Lower bound equation (lease out to autarky) 
 
  




















Upper bound equation (autarky to lease-in) 
 
   




















Log-likelihood -13032.05  -12070.83 
No. of observations  19,570  18,390 
Note: Time dummies and constants included but not reported.  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Proposition 1: The amount of land rented in (out) is strictly increasing (decreasing) in households’ agricultural 
ability, αi, and strictly decreasing (increasing) in the land endowment  i A . Rental markets will transfer land to 
efficient, but land-poor producers, thereby contributing to higher levels of productivity and more efficient factor 
use in the overall economy.  
Totally differentiating both sides of (2) with respect to α (ignoring the subscript to keep notation simple), yields:  
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Total differentiation of both sides of (3) or (4) with respect to α, yields: 
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From (A1), we obtain  α ∂
∂ a l ; substituting this into the (A2), with some manipulation of terms, gives: 
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Thus, for all households participating in rental markets (on either side), area operated increases with ability. The 
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implying that amount of land rented in (or out) is increasing (deceasing) in agricultural ability.   













the amount of land rented in (or out) is strictly decreasing (or increasing) in land endowment.  
 
Proposition 2: The presence of transaction costs defines two critical ability levels αl(TC
out, ..) and αu(TC
in, ..) 
such that households with ability αi∈[ αl; αu] will remain in autarky. Any increase in TC
in or TC
out will expand 
the autarky range, thus reducing the number of producers participating in rental markets and thus the number of 
efficiency-enhancing land transactions. Compared to a situation with no transaction cost, this will decrease 
productivity and social welfare.  
Using the functional form   for the production function, FOC (2-4) can be rewritten as:   2 1 2 1 1 ) , , (
β β β β α α A l A l f a a
− − =
             ( A 5 )   w A l p a =
− − − 2 1 1 2 1 1
1
β β β β α β
and for households who rented in:        ( A 6 )  
in
a TC r A l p + =
− − − 1 2 1 2 1 1
2
β β β β α β
  24for households who rented out:        ( A 7 )  
in
a TC r A l p − =
− − − 1 2 1 2 1 1
2
β β β β α β
Plugging  A A=  into (A5) allows us to obtain 
1 1
1
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Plugging   and 
*
a a l l = A A=  into (A7) allow us to derive 
2 1 1
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Similarly, plugging   and 
*
a a l l = A A=  into (A6) yields 
2 1 1
1

















u    (A10) 
This allows to show that ∂αl/∂TC
out<0 and ∂αu/∂TC
in>0, suggesting that increase in transaction costs reduces the 
number of producers participating in rental markets.  
 
Proposition 3: Increases of the exogenously given wage for off-farm employment will increase the amount of 
land transacted in rental markets by increasing the amount rented out by households with low agricultural ability 
(who will join the off-farm labor force) and the amount rented in by those with high-ability (who specialize in 
agricultural production). This will be associated with a decrease in the equilibrium rental rate which, in a risk-
free environment, will make everybody better off.  
First, we consider the case where there is no minimum labor (la

























































β β α r w A         ( A 1 1 ) ,  
suggesting that optimal operational land size is proportional to farming ability. Denoting by Δ all the right hand 
side terms except α, we can rewrite:   A
*= αΔ           ( A 1 2 )  
With total land in the economy being  A n , the land market clearing condition is ∫ = Δ
α
α
α α A n d . This allows us to 




A n . Substituting this into (A12) allows to solve for A
















































































r .  
The assumption of a minimum level of farm labor (la
c) implies that households who would optimally supply less 
than la
c to agriculture will move out of farming and rent out all their land. The key to solve this problem, is to 
find the critical farming ability (αc), i.e., any households with α< αc will have la
*<la
c (for ∂la
*/∂α >0) and 
therefore rent out all their land. Setting la
*=la
c allows us to solve for αc,  With some manipulation, we obtain: 
c
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A n d , 
plugging ac from (A13) into the market clearing condition allows us to obtain new Δ and consequently new 














































          ( A 1 4 )  
Setting A
**= A   also allows us to solve for another critical farming ability αau, which divides households 









































α         ( A 1 5 )  
Finally, equalizing both the right hand sides of equation (A11) and (A14) allow us to solve for the new 
equilibrium rental rate r
**. With some manipulations, we can obtain an explicit solution for r
** (not reported).  
























, which suggests that, as off-farm 
opportunities increase a larger number of households will drop farm production and rent out all their endowment, 
the equilibrium rental rate will decrease, households who remain in agricultural production cultivate more land, 
and more households will rent in land. 
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